Safety Relevance Assertions for Robotics Software Supply Chains

As robotics systems become increasingly autonomous, SBOMs help identify software components and dependencies, but they do not indicate which components contribute to safety functions, hazards, or safety goals.

This creates challenges when performing impact analysis, safety assessments, assurance activities, and evidence exchange across suppliers.

I have been exploring a concept called Safety Relevance Assertions, where software components can be associated with:

Safety relevance classification
Safety functions
Hazard links
Assurance evidence
Safety requirements
Example:

component: nav2_planner
safetyRelevance: SafetyRelevant
rationale: Contributes to collision avoidance
hazard: HZ-001

The goal is not to replace existing SBOM approaches, but to complement them by answering questions such as:

Which ROS packages are safety relevant?
Which software components are affected when a safety hazard changes?
Which suppliers need to provide assurance evidence?
How can safety context be exchanged across the robotics software supply chain?

Potential applications include ROS 2, Open-RMF, autonomous mobile robots, industrial robotics, medical robotics, and other safety-related robotic systems.

I would be interested in feedback from the community:

Is this a problem worth solving?
Are there existing efforts addressing this?
Would a ROS package metadata extension or SBOM extension be useful?
What robotics-specific use cases should be considered?

Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.